

## Armed groups in Sudan

### The South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration

Almost a year has passed since the Juba Declaration<sup>1</sup> formally merged the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), an umbrella of government-aligned armed groups. As part of the HSBA's ongoing review of Sudan's numerous armed groups,<sup>2</sup> this *Issue Brief* examines the role played by the SSDF in Sudan's intra-South conflicts, highlighting its origins, leadership, areas of operation, and recent change of fortune. In examining the extent to which the security threat posed by its members has been neutralized, it asks a number of key questions:

- **Has the SSDF been fully integrated into the SPLA?**
- **What are the obstacles hindering a meaningful reconciliation process?**
- **Why are some SSDF factions continuing to align themselves with Khartoum's Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)?**
- **What threats do armed groups pose to peace in the South?**

**The CPA stipulates that no armed groups allied to either the SPLA or the SAF shall be allowed to operate.**

While the Juba Declaration is almost as significant as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)<sup>3</sup> in terms of ensuring South Sudan's security, a variety of structural and logistical roadblocks to its implementation remain. The agreement has successfully eroded Khartoum's capacity to draw on alternative forces of armed southerners to challenge the SPLA militarily, but a small number of SSDF commanders who have rejected the Juba Declaration are continuing to generate insecurity in the South, particularly in greater Upper Nile.

Understanding the dynamics and structures of the SSDF and its relationship with the SPLA and the SAF is critical for successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and violence reduction in the South.<sup>4</sup>

### The context


Conflict in South Sudan occurs on two axes: North–South and intra-South.

The *North–South* conflict formally ended with the CPA on 9 January 2005. The CPA was signed by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A<sup>5</sup> and signaled a historic compromise: the government in Khartoum was guaranteed Sharia law in the North while the South gained the right to self-determination after an interim period of six years. With its provisions for a permanent internationally monitored ceasefire,



SPLA soldiers mourn during the funeral of former Sudanese vice-president and SPLA rebel leader John Garang in Juba, August 2005. © Morten Hvaal/WPN

## Other Armed Groups in South Sudan: main areas of operation as of September 2006



Map by **MAPgrafix**

power-sharing and access to oil wealth, the separation of religion and state, autonomy and a separate army, the CPA responded to key southern grievances.

Meanwhile, *intra-South* conflicts continued to fester and present threats to South Sudan's overall security environment. Despite its name, the CPA is not truly comprehensive. The deal was in fact a carefully crafted agreement between two dominant military élites. While the SPLM/A controls most of South Sudan, other militias

operating in the South were excluded from the negotiating process—cementing Garang's power base as well as that of his movement.

An index of the discontent was the increased violence between the SPLA and the SSDF during the peace negotiations. This exclusionary approach was grafted into the CPA, which stipulates that no armed groups allied to either the SPLA or the SAF shall be allowed to operate.<sup>6</sup>

## Box 1 Defining armed groups

Defining the characteristics of organized armed groups is surprisingly difficult. Several definitions exclude government-aligned forces, or paramilitary entities. The conventional definition of an armed group as an actor that 'is armed and uses force to achieve its objectives and is not under state control'<sup>7</sup> or simply as a 'non-state actor'<sup>8</sup> does not easily apply to Sudan.

The HSBA favours the broad definition put forward by Pablo Policzer (2005), which incorporates groups with defined links to, or receiving support from, the state. He defines these as 'challengers to the state's monopoly of legitimate coercive force'. This wider definition facilitates an analysis of the varied relationships between armed groups and the state, which are often fluid and rapidly changing. This was particularly true in both Sudanese civil wars (1956–72, 1983–2005), in which individuals and groups routinely changed their allegiances.

The SSDF represents the foremost of the excluded armed entities, referred to as Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the text of the CPA. Estimated to number between 10,000 and 30,000 fighters at the time of the agreement,<sup>9</sup> the SSDF comprised more than 30 militias that were aligned with the government. The SSDF not only threatened to undermine the authority of the SPLM/A and the legitimacy of the CPA, but also severely disrupted civilian livelihoods in many parts of the South.

The situation changed dramatically in early 2006. After John Garang's unexpected death in July 2005, his successor Salva Kiir negotiated the Juba Declaration in January 2006, which called for the immediate integration of the SSDF into the SPLA. Most, though not all, SSDF members have since aligned themselves with the SPLA. But the small number who remain aligned with Khartoum (so-called 'rump' forces) present a lingering threat to broader efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants and to civilian security more generally.

## Origins of the SSDF

The SSDF derives its origins from two main sources: first, local tribally based armed groups that arose to protect their communities from the SPLA, and second, from the forces that followed senior members Riek Machar and Lam Akol out of the SPLA when they split with its leader John Garang in 1991. The first group was made up mostly of militias from Ekuatoria with no developed political programme, while the second group sought southern self-determination against Garang's commitment to a united 'New Sudan'. Both components gained the support of the SAF, which saw them as important instruments to weaken the southern insurrection. The alliance with Riek<sup>10</sup> also provided the government the necessary security to develop an oil industry in the Nuer homeland of Western Upper Nile, Riek's power base.

In 1997, the Khartoum Peace Agreement formalized the alliance between the northern government and the groups that henceforth became known as the SSDF. The agreement included a commitment to a vote on southern self-determination but, crucially, failed to specify when it would take place.

In response to the government's failure to observe key provisions of the agreement, Riek Machar broke away. He formally rejoined the SPLA in January 2002, though most of his troops stayed behind with the SSDF. Meanwhile, in April 2001 Gatlaug Deng, the chairman of Khartoum's Southern Coordinating Council, had arranged a meeting in Juba that brought together the Ekuatoria-based militias and the government-aligned liberation movements to bolster SSDF strength.

## Leadership and organization

Maj.-Gen. Paulino Matieb, a Bul Nuer from Unity State, was appointed chief of staff of the SSDF in 2001 and held this position until the Juba Declaration of January 2006. But Paulino's position and those of his high command were considered largely symbolic.

In fact, real power was held by the SAF's Military Intelligence (MI) and exercised through local-level SSDF commanders. These included Peter Dor in Western Upper Nile, Gordon Kong in Eastern Upper Nile, Gabriel Tangyangi and Thomas Maboir in Central Upper Nile, Benson Kwany in the Doleib Hill area, and Chayout in Longochok, together with Ismael Konye from the Murle, Kelement Wani from the Mundari, Martin Kenyi in Eastern Ekuatoria, Abdel Bagi from the Dinka of northern Bahr El Ghazal, and Atom Al-Nour, who led the Ferit militia.

Although the SSDF and the SAF were aligned in opposing the SPLA, the relationship was far from robust. The SSDF's considerable military capacity, support for southern independence, and intense dislike of its northern patrons represented a constant threat to the government. To minimize these threats, MI kept the SSDF under close scrutiny and control, and worked to ensure that it did not develop a strong leadership. By deliberately encouraging ambitious or dissenting local-level commanders to challenge their superiors or establish breakaway components, MI was effective in keeping the SSDF vertically weak.

The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was maintained by providing resources and status to SSDF commanders and playing the 'ethnic card'. By providing high-ranking positions and cash payouts to senior commanders while simultaneously drawing on popular prejudices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group (the SSDF was primarily a Nuer organization),<sup>11</sup> Khartoum assured itself control. As the SSDF leaders became comparatively wealthy, ordinary soldiers received little compensation and often resorted instead to looting of civilians to feed themselves. As a result, local resentment of the forces intensified.

## Areas of operation and capacity

It is clear that the various components of the SSDF had considerable capacity, even if estimating its total size is problematic (see Box 2). Crucially, they provided security for the oil fields of Western Upper Nile and Adar. Moreover, during the second civil war they surrounded and protected the SAF garrison towns located throughout the South. Equally significant, as northerners became increasingly reluctant to engage their enemies in direct combat, the SSDF assumed the role of 'SAF proxy' in waging war against the SPLA. Their reported fighting prowess undoubtedly benefited from the Nuer (and to a lesser extent Murle) emphasis on martial values.

The SSDF proved immensely successful in mobilizing local communities fearful of the SPLA. For example, it established short-term alliances with the so-called 'white army', armed Sudanese civilians who were militarily active on an ad hoc basis.<sup>12</sup> These alliances proved to be especially effective in bolstering their forces in Central and Eastern Upper Nile.

But because the SAF never fully trusted the SSDF, it never offered training, independent logistical support, or heavy equipment or artillery. In fact, ammunition was only supplied immediately prior to each military engagement. While the Khartoum Peace Agreement stipulated that the United Democratic Salvation Front would serve as the political wing of the SSDF, there was never an organic link between the two entities. The SSDF remained a local military body with few political engagements or ties.

## The road to the Juba Declaration

The SSDF itself was never entirely comfortable with its ties to the SAF. Its leadership repeatedly sought to engage the SPLA in negotiations, but John Garang refused. Among other reasons, he feared that the integration of

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such a large (Nuer) group into the SPLA would threaten his leadership. Instead, Garang encouraged individual SSDF commanders to defect. A number of commanders did so, but they often found themselves rapidly marginalized within the SPLA. As news filtered back about their reduced status, fewer SSDF chose to leave the SAF alliance.

The signing of the CPA in January 2005 excluded and outlawed all OAGs, including the SSDF, whose options for political and military responses were limited. In fact, open opposition to the CPA was not feasible owing to its immense popularity in the South, including among

## Box 2 Estimating SSDF numbers

The SSDF comprised a significant number of fighting forces at its peak of activities. During the latter stages of the second civil war various components of the SSDF controlled large tracts of land in Western, Central, and Eastern Upper Nile, northern and western Bahr El Ghazal, and Eastern Equatoria; they were critical in making possible the development and operation of the country's emerging oil industry. Gaining this control required considerable numbers of men operating in different locations simultaneously.

Determining an exact estimate of the SSDF is highly problematic. The most convincing estimates place its numbers at between 10,000 and 30,000. As is the case with most armed groups in Africa and elsewhere, SSDF numbers fluctuated constantly.<sup>13</sup> The group is composed largely of non-regular forces and the dividing line between civilians and combatants is blurred. In addition, some individuals may identify themselves as affiliated at one moment but then reject the label once a particular objective has been achieved or abandoned. All estimates must thus be treated with caution.

SSDF communities. While further attempts at reconciliation were attempted, Garang, feeling his position to be strong, gave little ground. In July 2005, negotiations between the SPLA and the SSDF dissolved in acrimony and renewed conflict appeared imminent.

Following Garang's death in a helicopter accident on 30 July 2005, the situation changed significantly. His successor, Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir, sensing that southern opinion supported southern unity, pursued a peaceful resolution. During his first visit to Khartoum as vice-president of Sudan in August 2005, Salva held a number of informal meetings with the SSDF leadership. There he promised positions for SSDF commanders in the new Government of South Sudan that was created by the CPA and proposed a full-fledged merger between the two enemy camps, to which the SSDF leadership responded favourably.

The merger took the form of the Juba Declaration of January 2006. The Declaration provided for the official integration of the SSDF into the SPLA, the establishment of a joint committee to issue recommendations on the ranks of incoming SSDF officers, and a promise of equal treatment for newly integrated forces. In addition, Salva appointed former SSDF Chief of Staff Paulino Matieb his deputy. Informally Paulino was also given considerable influence over incoming SSDF forces and for deployment to the highly contentious areas of Western Upper Nile, Abyei, and northern Bahr El Ghazal.

The majority of SSDF members have since joined the SPLA.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, many commanders who did not initially integrate are continuing to align themselves to the SPLA. For example, Ismael Konye, who maintained a heavily armed force in the Pibor area numbering 200–300 at the time of the Juba Declaration, declared his allegiance to the SPLA in October 2006. Although not immediately responding to the Juba Declaration,

Kelement Wani, now serving as the governor of Central Equatoria, formally joined the SPLM/A in August 2006. Even so, a minority of SSDF commanders have opted to remain aligned with the SAF, keeping as many of their rump forces as they could convince to stay.

The following are among the SSDF armed groups, splinter groups, and factions that have remained aligned with Khartoum since the Juba Declaration:

- Gordon Kong, who now leads the main rump SSDF of between 300–400 in Nasir, Adar, and Malakal (see Box 3);
- Gabriel Tangyangi, who maintains a force of approximately 400 in the New Fanjak area;
- Thomas Maboir, who while based in Khartoum has a small force of under 100 in Doleib Hill; and
- Atom Al-Nour, who commands a force of 200–300 in the Wau area.

Khartoum appears to be actively supporting some of these rump SSDF since the signing of the Juba Declaration. Its rationale is that they might disrupt the peace process in the future and create instability that could effectively undermine the CPA-stipulated referendum on

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southern independence. This strategy is analogous to the one applied by the North to postpone an earlier referendum mandated by the Khartoum Peace Agreement.

The Juba Declaration has also generated outright splits among certain SSDF groups. In some cases, these splits are revealed by violent infighting, including in the Khartoum suburbs of Kalakla and Add Hussein. As of October 2006, split groups include the forces of James Othow and Benson Kwany, both in Doleib Hill. About 100 of James Othow's forces—who were formerly Lam Akol's troops—remained behind after he aligned himself with the SPLA.<sup>15</sup> While most of Benson Kwany's Mobile Forces, also in Doleib Hill, aligned themselves with the SPLA, some also remain in the SAF camp.

The status of Kwany himself is unclear. Further, since SAF departed from Torit, a group of approximately 400 former SSDF-aligned Equatoria Defence Force members remain behind, contributing to insecurity. Others have

### Box 3 An SSDF holdout: Gordon Kong

Gordon Kong remains one of the more formidable holdouts to the SPLA–SSDF merger, controlling areas of particular significance to South Sudan's overall peace. His forces are based in Upper Nile State, specifically in Malakal, Adar, and north of Nasir. As of August 2006 he claimed about 75–85 active rump forces, though he also counts about 300 additional reserve forces in the surrounding area. Most of the weapons used by his militia include small arms, though there also appear to be light machine guns and mortars scattered throughout militia camps.<sup>16</sup> Kong's core faction, the Nasir Peace Force, is based in the village of Ketbek, just a few kilometres north of Nasir.

Kong has publicly rejected alignment with the SPLA and denounced the Juba Declaration though his motives are hard to discern. As with other militias who have not aligned themselves with the SPLA, it appears that his primary political objective is to retain his power base until the 2011 referendum on southern secession. By staying out of the SPLA, he may be expecting to secure more leverage and authority. For these and other reasons, it is likely that Kong's forces will resist all SPLA or UN-led DDR efforts before the referendum.<sup>17</sup> For now it appears that he is stalling until the political landscape of South Sudan becomes more settled. But the Commissioner of Sobat District in Upper Nile, Garouth Garkoth, reported that Gordon was recently informed that he had until December 2006 to declare his affiliation with the SPLA, after which his soldiers would be forcibly removed from Nasir.<sup>18</sup>

A significant contingent of Kong's forces is located near Adar in Northern Upper Nile State as well as other small towns in its vicinity. These forces include at least two groups of some 200 fighters. The Adar forces also maintained a base in Guelguk (west of Adar) well into 2006. The proximity of these various forces to each other and to local oil fields, as

well as to the border with North Sudan, puts the area at high risk for confrontation. Particularly important is the Adar oil field, which is currently operational.<sup>19</sup> SPLM/A members report that Adar is considered a key strategic location for Khartoum should hostilities between the SAF and the SPLM/A ever reignite.<sup>20</sup>

SAF logistical support to and command of these forces comes from its bases in Kosti and Adar (an assembly point for SAF forces in the south, in accordance with the CPA).<sup>21</sup> Though estimates vary, there are between 300 to 400 active duty SSDF forces in and around the surrounding area.<sup>22</sup> These include the arrival in July 2006 of four busloads of new SSDF recruits who were previously based in Khartoum.<sup>23</sup>

In this context, the issue of oil revenues remains a contentious one. The Longochok County Commissioner accuses the resident oil company, Petrodar, of receiving indirect support from the Adar rump SSDF militia.<sup>24</sup> Local South Sudan authorities contend that the SSDF prevent them from extending their presence in the area. Moreover, authorities claim that Petrodar bypasses them and works directly with the NCP. This directly contradicts the spirit and letter of the CPA, which stipulates that oil revenues should be shared among Khartoum, South Sudan, and, to a lesser extent, state governments where oil-drilling occurs.

Meanwhile, SPLM/A officials complain that they do not know how much oil is actually being produced because the oil companies deal directly with NCP officials and accounts are not publicly available. While the Government of South Sudan has received some oil revenues, as of August 2006 Upper Nile State (which was to receive 2 per cent of total oil revenues) had yet to receive any.

Source: LeRiche and Arnold (2006)

been integrated into existing or newly created components of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a government paramilitary group. This fragmentation threatens to affect Upper Nile State in particular.

## Critical issues

The Juba Declaration has raised expectations of the eventual reconciliation of former enemies through the integration of the SSDF into the SPLA. Now that this objective has been set, it is critical that the integration be satisfactorily accomplished. Can Salva Kiir and the administration of the SPLA handle the major challenge of incorporating thousands of former enemies into its ranks? In addition to the external pressure of the SAF's continued support of rump SSDF forces, the integration operation faces a number of potential obstacles:

**Power struggle within the SPLM/A.** The SPLM/A continues to suffer from an internal division between supporters of Salva Kiir and those who support the late John Garang. Salva's pro-reconciliation stance towards the SSDF has increased his support base since the incoming soldiers are both loyal to their new leader and frequently still at odds with those previously close to the anti-integration Garang. In this context, tribal undercurrents persist, as the largely Dinka SPLA opens its doors to the

mainly Nuer SSDF. These leadership and tribal tensions threaten the integration of the SSDF into the SPLA and the development of a robust army for the South.

## The SSDF's transformation from a guerrilla group to a politically independent army and governing party requires significant reforms.

**Integrating SSDF forces still waiting for ranks.** A particularly difficult problem is the assignment of appropriate ranks for incoming SSDF officers, without which they remain sidelined and unintegrated. The present composition of the SPLA high command remains the same today as it was before the signing of the Juba Declaration. This issue is of critical importance to incoming forces: the longer it is delayed, the longer incoming SSDF will be marginalized, increasing the likelihood of discontent and violence.<sup>25</sup> Lessons from previous DDR operations in Africa suggest that the integration of former enemies into an existing command structure will be extremely difficult for many SPLA members to accept.



### Transformation of the SPLM/A into a governing body.

The transformation of the SPLM/A from a highly militarized rebel movement into a politically independent army and democratic party requires substantive and lengthy reforms. The challenges facing the SPLM/A—including reversing the world's lowest human development indices and non-existent public infrastructure—would be monumental for even the most efficient and well-funded administration.

To be successful, the SPLM/A will need to develop a culture of accountability and transparency and to eschew rule by excessive military force. Although Salva Kiir and his supporters are making the professionalization of the army a major priority, his views are not always shared by others in the SPLM/A leadership.

## Conclusion

Prior to the Juba Declaration, the SSDF posed a major threat to both the peace process and to the SPLM/A. The recent alignment of most of the SSDF components with the SPLA is an encouraging development.

Nevertheless, some rump SSDF commanders and their followers, with likely support from Khartoum, retain the capacity to generate instability in selected areas of the South. As in the period following the Khartoum

Peace Agreement, the national government appears to be keeping open its options for future actions to unsettle the peace process.

The merging of the SSDF and SPLA into a single unit remains highly problematic, yet a great deal hinges on its success. As of mid-September 2006, nine months after the agreement, only Paulino Matieb's SSDF component had been fully integrated into the SPLA.<sup>26</sup> The SPLA must find money, space, and tolerance for the former enemies now arriving in its ranks while simultaneously coming to grips with an internal divide between Salva Kiir's supporters and the 'Garangists'. What is more, it faces a major challenge to transform from a rebel force into an accountable and transparent governing body and army. Whether it will be up to the task of managing locally administered DDR remains an open question.

It is crucial that the SPLM/A be supported to undertake not just DDR but also internal reform. Unless the SPLM/A can move quickly to establish effective systems of administration, oversee development programmes, and respond to widespread grievances, there is a real danger that achievements in the security sphere will dissolve under the weight of internal dissent. Given the SPLA's past tendency to respond to dissension with force, and for the recipients to respond aggressively, such a scenario could prove disastrous for South Sudan.

## Notes

- 1 The full text of the Juba Declaration is available at <<http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/jubadecljan06.pdf>>
- 2 The SSDF will be treated at greater length in *The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration*, the HSBA Working Paper associated with this Issue Brief. Available at <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>> (click on Sudan).
- 3 The full text of the CPA is available at <<http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf>>
- 4 See, for example, Muggah (2005) for a review of DDR options.
- 5 The SPLA is the military wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).
- 6 CPA, Agreement on Security Arrangements, Art. 7(a).
- 7 See, for example, ICHRP (2000, p. 5). See also Bruderlein (2000) of the Harvard School of Public Health, who stipulates that armed groups have 'a basic command structure', use 'violence to achieve political ends', and are independent 'from state control'.
- 8 This term is favoured by Geneva Call, an NGO that campaigns for armed groups to adhere to international law, with particular emphasis on international humanitarian law.
- 9 The HSBA generated the high estimate of 30,000 on the basis of Sudan's previously reported Military Intelligence (MI) figures. Lower estimates were rendered on the basis of interviews with OAG commanders in the South and SPLM/A estimates of 'hard-core' SSDF members. If 'white army' elements and additional splinter factions are included, the number could be higher still. These estimates do not include those affiliated with the SSDF, such as porters, carriers, or unarmed members.
- 10 In South Sudan, it is a common convention to refer to people by their first names only. (John Garang is an exception.) This *Sudan Issue Brief* follows this practice.
- 11 The major ethnic groups of South Sudan include the Dinka, the Nuer, the Azande, the Toposa, the Shilluk, and the Murle, in descending order of percentage of population (NSCSE/UNICEF, 2004).
- 12 The 'white army' will be discussed further in an upcoming HSBA Working Paper.
- 13 See Florquin and Berman (2005).
- 14 This was confirmed by a HSBA researcher during field visits to the South in February–March and August–September 2006.
- 15 These forces were undergoing military training at the base near the Malakal airport at the time of the first HSBA field visit (February 2006).
- 16 Observations during a field visit to camp at Ketbek, 1 August 2006.

- 17 Interview with UNMIS official in Juba, August 2006, and multiple interviews with Kong lieutenants and SPLA officers in Malakal and Juba, July–August 2006.
- 18 Interview with Commissioner Garouth, Malakal, August 2006.
- 19 See USAID for maps of current Sudan Oil Concessions at <<http://www.usaid.gov>>
- 20 Interviews with SPLM/A senior official in Malakal, August 2006.
- 21 Interview with County Commissioner in Adar, August 2006.
- 22 Interviews with senior South Sudan officials in Malakal, August 2006.
- 23 Interviews with senior SPLA officials in Malakal, August 2006.
- 24 Informal conversations with South Sudan and oil company employees in Juba, August 2006.
- 25 It is also important to recall that the below-average literacy rates and poor training of the SSDF forces—many of whom were promoted above their abilities by the SAF—are unlikely to be welcomed by SPLA officers.
- 26 The estimated force size is between 500 and 2,500.

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## The HSBA project

### Project summary

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a two-year research programme (2005–07) administered by the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNMIS, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. The assessment is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It will review the spatial distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offer policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.

Sudan *Issue Briefs* are designed to provide periodic snapshots of baseline data. Future editions will focus on other armed groups, the trade and transfer of small arms into and out of Sudan, local security arrangements, and victimization rates. The project will also generate a series of timely and user-friendly *Working Papers* in English and Arabic, which will appear on [www.smallarmssurvey.org](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org).

The HSBA project is supported by Foreign Affairs Canada.

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